

2006

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

February 11

"Do not place our internal affairs in such a shape that we cannot control them," he begged the Senators. Horton called the refusal to state plainly that water quality was not being guaranteed an "evasion" and said it was "evidence of lack of good faith even before the treaty is ratified."

However, there is no doubt that in 1945 many people in Mexico, as well as the United States, thought the treaty was a good deal for everybody. About 100 miles of the river's 1,450-mile length flows through Mexican territory, but the entire flow of the river is produced in the United States and all the natural damsites are in the United States. Reclamation works in this country have turned a river which once fluctuated between "a trickle and a flood" into a managed resource.

Under the treaty Mexico was guaranteed about double the amount of water it previously had been able to use beneficially. With a firm water supply agriculture expanded enormously in the Mexicali Valley until a peak of 500,000 acres were under irrigation.

Perhaps it should be remembered that California was opposed to the treaty. The California Legislature appropriated \$50,000 in 1945 to lobby against it. The Golden State saw even then that the growth in the Southwest would soon drink up even the mighty Colorado and valid claims in the river could someday be a matter of survival.

## CUBA

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may proceed for an additional 5 minutes or so. The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, we will undoubtedly be hearing a lot about Cuba this week, as we have for the past several weeks and as we did prior to October 22, 1962. The Senate will recall, in the latter instance, that campaign oratory on Cuba was in full flower at that time. Then, suddenly, the Nation looked war fully in the face, and the busy tongues fell still. We placed our trust as a nation where it belongs in an international crisis—in the President—and he led the Nation through that grim crisis with magnificent courage, great wisdom and careful restraint.

Now, apparently, there is a margin of safety again. There is a little elbow room this side of the next grave crisis. And there are, once again, a lot of elbows elbowing for space in it to play CIA Chief, Defense Department Chief, and Secretary of State, if not President of the United States.

Let me make clear, Mr. President, that I am not calling for an end to discussion of Cuba or of any other issue which confronts the people of this Nation. Senators not infrequently have information and constructive insights in these matters which can be of value to the Nation. They should not be constrained to silence but should be urged to communicate in these matters. In matters of information, of course, I have no doubt that members of both parties know the difference between a conjecture and a fact. They know well that in delicate matters of foreign relations, there is a vast difference between heat and light. They know very well that beyond the urge of anxiety to do something about Cuba there is the difficult problem of defining

a constructive course of doing something. Two Presidents have been working on this problem for years, and the problem is still with us.

Knowing that Members of Congress are speaking on Cuba with these lofty thoughts of the Nation's welfare in mind I am disturbed by the amount of information on Cuba which certain Members of Congress appear to have but which is not available to the responsible officials of the Cabinet—the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. We have congressional reports of missiles. We have the last congressional word on the attitudes of Latin American nations toward U.S. policies on Cuba. And all the while, the executive branch has different information or no information on the same matters.

I would be the last one to suggest that any Member of Congress might know less about these critical and delicate matters pertaining to Cuba than the President, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. After all, these executive branch officers have many responsibilities, and Cuba is only one of them. And in these early weeks of the session, some Members of Congress have apparently had nothing else to worry about except Cuba.

But I would suggest most respectfully, Mr. President, that the responsible course, the course which helps rather than hurts the Nation, would be for these well-informed Members to take their inside unimpeachable information on Cuba to the appropriate departments at the same time that they take it to the press galleries. After all, it is the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA who have to deal with these matters in the end, and I am sure these officials would appreciate any information which they can obtain so that they, in turn, can pass it on to the President whose responsibility the conduct of foreign policy is. Or if the Members need to protect their sources, as newsmen do, and do not trust the Secretaries of State or Defense or the CIA Director, then perhaps they might wish to give their information to the President. I want to offer now my services as confidential messenger to any Member of this body to carry to the President information or suggestions which he or she feels the President does not have and must have if he is to conduct our policies with regard to Cuba effectively. I would, in this connection, note that the President reads many newspapers carefully, and if the Member's information or ideas have already appeared in the press there would be little point in repeating them in private to him.

In this connection, I should note that it is my understanding, according to the radio, that a Senator has said, in effect, that if the administration does not put into operation the recommendations and suggestions which he made to Mr. John McCone, Director of the CIA, last week, he will publicize them. I also understand that another distinguished Senator has said that some kind of an understanding was made by the President with Chairman Khrushchev at the time of the October crisis and that our part of the

deal, the removal of Jupiter bases from Italy and Turkey and Thor bases from England, is now being consummated.

May I say to these two Senators that if the one wants to publicize his recommendations, he should take the responsibility of doing so if he thinks it is in the national interest. To the other I would suggest that he establish contact with the Defense Department to find out just how long before Cuba the removal of these bases from Europe was being considered and to find out why this was done. May I assure him there is absolutely no foundation to his charge of an understanding which implies a secret deal, and may I say to him further that his Republican colleagues in the leadership in both Houses have been called to the White House on many occasions and have been kept fully informed of all developments in the Cuban situation.

I note, too, Mr. President, that over the weekend, the distinguished Governor of New York also felt impelled to enter the public discussion of Cuba. I welcomed his participation, Mr. President, but I must confess that I looked in vain for a contribution worthy of him. After all, the Governor of New York is one of the most qualified men in the Nation on Latin American affairs. Over the years, he has worked on the problems of that region, as a private citizen and as an official of the U.S. Government, with vast powers to do something about them. And even now, the Governor has in his own backyard, so to speak, in New York City, a microcosm of the immense problems of poverty, human neglect, and inequity which are at the root of the ills of Latin America.

One would expect from an authority of his stature a deep insight into what ought to be done; some possible answers on the Cuban situation. But the Governor found only that Cuba was a cause of difficulty in Latin America; and, according to the press, Mr. President, the Governor said that what we need is more information.

It is not so much more information that we need on this subject. We have the facts supplied by President Kennedy and Cabinet officials, and we have every conjecture on Cuba that political fantasy can devise. We have a surfeit of information, Mr. Kennedy. What we really need is more restraint on irresponsible public utterances which are playing dangerously with the fires of public emotion. What we really need from the Governor and from the Senate are constructive suggestions that will help ease the Cuban situation.

The presentation of the Cuban situation by the Defense Department last week, followed by the President's press conference, was a combined statement of intelligence and broad policy and a firm and unequivocal presentation of the administration's stand in Cuba. The President of the United States—any President—can act in a situation involving war or peace only on intelligence of which he is sure. To act otherwise would be irresponsible and would not be in the best interests of our country.

On last October the President received intelligence several days before he called a meeting of the leadership on October

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ing them. Facilitating this step has been one of the primary objectives of the Select Committee on National Water Resources."

In the 44 years the Mississippi Valley Association has been meeting to assess the growth and needs of our rivers, much has been recorded along the road of progress. But we are just getting started on the road to full and complete control of our water supply. Much remains to be done—but with the Mississippi Valley Association on the sidelines—I am confident the future of our inland waterways is in capable hands.

This has been said many times, but is worth repeating. The history of every civilization that the world has ever known has been tied to the care and proper use of the nation's water resources.

Babylon, China, the Holy Lands, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and others attained a high degree of prosperity so long as they husbanded their water resources. They all deteriorated when there was not enough water.

The pattern of man's development and the periods of growth and deterioration all followed the same pattern:

- Bondage to spiritual faith.
- Spiritual faith to great courage.
- Courage to liberty.
- Liberty to abundance.
- Abundance to selfishness.
- Selfishness to complacency.
- Complacency to apathy.
- Apathy to dependency.
- Dependency to bondage.

We in America are now in the period of abundance—where we go from here depends on you and me.

## NATIONAL ACTORS' EQUITY WEEK

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I was honored to join the distinguished Senators from New York [Mr. KEATING and Mr. JAVITS], and the Senators from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK and Mr. SCOTT] in introducing a joint resolution designating the week of May 20-28, 1963, as National Actors' Equity Week.

This will commemorate the 50th anniversary of Actors' Equity. Founded on May 26, 1913, Equity now boasts a membership of some 13,000 professional actors and performers, ranging from the unknowns in the chorus to the greatest stars of the legitimate stage. Through the years Equity has been the decisive factor in guaranteeing adequate wages and working conditions and has also been a prime source of strength in the enrichment of the cultural life of the entire Nation.

While the legitimate stage is currently faced with many difficult problems, it is also simultaneously entering its most creative and hopeful era. The rising costs associated with major Broadway productions have forced the price of admissions steadily upward, making it difficult for persons of average income to attend the theater with any regularity. Similarly, the high costs of Broadway shows have kept producers from gambling with unknown talent or highly creative and original productions.

But this is also the era of off-Broadway theater groups presenting highly stimulating, creative, and successful theater at prices within the range of the average theatergoer. Moreover, throughout the United States local acting companies are bringing first-class theater to communities where legitimate theater had never existed. The new Tyrone Guthrie

Theater in the Twin Cities and the Arena Stage in Washington are two outstanding examples of these new endeavors. The Ford Foundation has recently provided badly needed financial support to a number of such resident groups.

In short, as Actors' Equity begins its second half century it faces both problems and opportunities. I am confident that Equity will continue to be a major factor in guaranteeing a flourishing American theater in the decades ahead.

Representative JOHN LINDSAY, who represents the New York theater district, has introduced a similar joint resolution in the House of Representatives. I hope prompt action is possible in both Houses so that National Actors' Equity Week can be designated by an act of Congress. It would be a fitting and highly appropriate tribute to this fine organization.

## COLORADO RIVER DISPUTE

Mr. ENGLE. Mr. President, I have inserted in the RECORD parts 1 and 2 of a four-part series of articles from the San Diego (Calif.) Union. Today, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD part 3. The series of articles reports on the dispute between the United States and Mexico over salt in the Colorado River.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WASHINGTON.—Negotiating a treaty seems to be something like buying a used car. It doesn't matter what you think he said; or what he thinks you said. All that matters is what's in the fine print—or what a judge says is in the fine print.

Mexico and the United States are finding this out about a treaty which they signed in 1944 with the hope that it would settle for all time the rights of the two countries to water in the mighty Colorado River.

The river is the most valuable resource shared by the two countries and, in fact, is the largest single source of water for the entire Southwest.

The treaty worked pretty well until last year. Then the Mexican Government complained that the water it was getting had become too salty to be used for irrigating.

That was the point when the two countries parted company on the meaning of the 1944 treaty. And as both sides began digging back into history to support their contentions it sometimes seemed as though each side must have operated in a vacuum.

The U.S. State Department set the tone for this country's official stand on December 21 with the following communique:

"The United States considers that it is fully complying with its obligations under the treaty, which placed no obligation on the United States to deliver any specified quantity of water." Then follows an important sentence:

"It was widely understood at the time that the treaty was concluded that the saline condition of the water might increase as a result of the development of the Colorado River Basin . . ."

The State Department went on to say that the United States would do all it could to help the Mexican farmers without compromising U.S. legal rights under the treaty.

Mexico flatly rejected the U.S. interpretation of the treaty and, based on its own reading of the document, argued that the water supplied to it must be "usable" to fulfill U.S. obligations. Later the Mexican position was expanded to include a charge that the very salty water being discharged into

the river by Arizona's Wellton Mohawk Irrigation District was not "return flow" as understood by the treaty but "contamination."

But although Mexico would like to portray Wellton Mohawk as the villain, its basic contention is that the 1944 treaty contains some assurance that the water it gets will be of acceptable quality.

The official U.S. position is that there is no such guarantee in the treaty and further that any guarantee was specifically exempted by the men who wrote the treaty and the men who ratified it.

With the benefit of hindsight, the transcripts of the treaty ratifications hearings by both countries make fascinating reading. Take the testimony of Engineer Aldo Orive Alba, head of the Mexican National Irrigation Commission, before Mexican senators on July 31, 1945. Senor Orive must have set a record for poor forecasting that day.

"With respect to the possibility that water delivered to us from the Colorado River may be of poor quality because it contains dissolved salts, we can state on the basis of reasons of both a technical and a legal nature that fortunately such a danger does not exist," he said.

"The water is intended for irrigation . . . therefore in this treaty, as in any other of this nature, it is fully understood that the water must be of good quality."

Orive said Mexico had the right to demand virgin flow from the river but would be willing to accept return flow (water which had been used by upstream irrigators and allowed to go back into the river). Orive didn't stop there. He assured the Mexican Senate:

"The most pessimistic technical calculations show that even if return-flow water of high salinity reaches the Colorado River this return flow mixed with the rest of the allotment to our country would make a mixture which our country probably would accept in accordance with its undeniable right to water of good quality."

It is worth noting that Orive was testifying after the U.S. Senate, in its own hearings, had heard our State Department spokesmen take just the opposite stand.

Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson was asked if it was his Department's contention that Mexico . . . must take water regardless of quality? Acheson said, "Yes". Senator Sheridan Downey, of California, asked Acheson why the words "regardless of quality" could not be inserted in the treaty.

The Assistant Secretary, who was later to be Secretary, cautioned against suggesting doubts where there are no doubts. He explained the interpretation still held by the United States that the treaty limited Mexico to water from any and all sources and whatever their origin.

"Even though it becomes so saline that it is not usable by Mexico?" Downey asked him. "Those are the plain words of the treaty, Senator," Acheson replied.

Earlier, R. J. Tipton, a consulting engineer for a protreaty six States committee, was even more positive. It was Tipton's unqualified opinion that from the language of the treaty a court or an international arbitration tribunal would not hold that Mexico was entitled to water fit for irrigation. Tipton added the interesting comment that if the words "regardless of quality" were used in the treaty the Mexican Senate might not ratify it.

But the Tipton opinion on water quality was not unanimously accepted even on the American side. Clay C. Elder, a Los Angeles water expert, testified that if return flow water became too salty it could be described as salty brine and not as water at all.

Harry W. Horton, chief counsel for the Imperial Irrigation District, seemed to foresee the present problem.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE
TO: <i>Hank</i>		<i>2/12/63</i>
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	
REMARKS:		
<p><i>I have marked a number of references to CIA in this same of which I think the Boss might want to know about.</i></p>		

FORM NO. 241  
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8  
WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO : 1957-O-439445

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22. To be absolutely sure he had that initial intelligence confirmed again and again, but in the meantime he ordered the Air Force on a strict alert, he increased the Armed Forces in Guantanamo, and ordered Marines and other combat elements into the Caribbean area from as far away as the West Coast. The policy he pursued then was one which took the unavoidable risk of involving this country in nuclear war. The Republican leadership knew it; the American people knew it; and Mr. Khrushchev knew it.

I believe that the intelligence furnished the President under the direction of Mr. John McCone is excellent. I believe that the combined judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. McCone that swift preparation in Cuba for an offense could not go undetected is accurate.

May I remind my Republican colleagues that Cuba is only one of a number of difficulties which confront the President of the United States and, thereby, all of us, regardless of party, at this time. I would call to their attention the recent events in Iraq, the ever-present danger at West Berlin, the critical situation in South Vietnam, the difficulties in various parts of Latin America, and the ever-present dangers at Taiwan and Korea.

I would call on all to be less interested in the partisan politics of attacking the President and his policy and to be more interested in the national need to be constructive and to come forward with the kind of assistance which any President needs at any crucial period in our history.

Insofar as the Senator from Montana is concerned, he believes that the Cuban difficulty is being handled in a most responsible fashion by the President of the United States. I trust him to continue to handle it in that fashion. What the rest of us need most of all to do is to get down to the business of legislating on the inner ills of this Nation. We are not going to gird this Nation for the tests of our times by playing guessing games on the facts in the Cuban situation. There is the hard business of dealing with the facts at home which the President set forth in his state of the Union message. Let us get on with our work and let us do so responsibly and constructively.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD, as a part of the remarks I have made on Cuba, a commentary entitled "Intelligence Gathering: In Cuba or Elsewhere, Imprecision Is Hard To Avoid," written by Philip Geyelin, and published in the Wall Street Journal of today, February 11, 1963.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING: IN CUBA OR ELSEWHERE, IMPRECISION IS HARD TO AVOID  
(By Philip Geyelin)

WASHINGTON.—Some 17,000 Soviet troops are now in Cuba, President Kennedy and his top associates now estimate with a public air of certainty. Yet they would be less than stunned, and the Government's intelligence gatherers would not be greatly abashed, if

this estimate should have to be drastically altered a week or a month from now—without a single Soviet soldier actually moving in or out of Cuba in the interval.

Congressional critics of the Kennedy administration's Cuban policies doubtless would be up in arms. Uneasy citizens probably would be shocked. But the unhappy fact is that apart from one downward adjustment in troop estimates based on the actual departure of 4,000 Russian troops, the United States has been hastily revising upward its estimate of Soviet troop strength in Cuba in past months, not on account of new arrivals but simply because fresh evidence revealed that original calculations were far too low.

All this points up a problem that promises to bedevil the Kennedy administration's conduct of Cuban policy for just as long as the Cuban crisis lasts. The root of the problem is simply that imprecision, revision and indecision are facts of life in the complex, clandestine world of intelligence.

And Cuba's tightly closed police state is a classic case in point. For "absolute assurance" on Cuban doings, as Central Intelligence Agency Chief John McCone said the other day, the United States would require "continuing penetrating on-site inspection," but since the shutdown of the U.S. Embassy in Havana 3 years ago, the U.S. Government officially hasn't a single representative on the spot. Instead, it must rely entirely on aerial photography, spy networks on the ground, the Havana embassies of friendly nations, and refugee reports. These sources supplied the bits and pieces of information which, when welded together, convinced President Kennedy to take the world to the brink of war last October, and now convince him Cuba poses no offensive military threat.

## VARIETY OF TECHNIQUES

Some of the ingredients are incredibly precise. A U-2 aircraft, soaring at 80,000 feet, over Cuba, can peer into the open holds of a ship and provide the dimensions of a crate. It can furnish the height of a Soviet soldier and probably tell if he needed a haircut. It can pick up the tracks of a truck in rough terrain. It can provide a welter of detail about goods in the process of being loaded or unloaded from ships and could produce a highly accurate troop nose-count—If the Russians would be amiable enough to mass their total Cuban strength out in the open on parade.

But the Russians have not been so amiable. Havana harbor, moreover, boasts one set of covered docks, where unloading is quite impossible to photograph. Nor can aerial cameras pierce closed hatch covers, warehouses—or caves.

So the highly technical process of reading photo negatives is only the beginning of aerial intelligence, a process, which in the case of Cuba, required an astounding variety of supplementary fact-finding. For instance, the business of identifying those 42 Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba can be said to have begun with sober study of the length of a brick in Moscow's Red Square. By using the bricks as a measuring rod, photos of Russian rocketry in the annual May Day Red Square parade yielded rather precise dimensions of the weaponry.

With these dimensions and by working on the assumption that Russian and U.S. missile designers are subject to the same laws of physics and aerodynamics, U.S. specialists can deduce a rocket's probable thrust and range. With this data, they could then draw conclusions about the nature of missiles photographed in Cuba, dimensions of these missiles could be calculated in relation to some item in the photos whose size is known—say the gage of a railway track.

The United States knew well before last October's missile crisis that Mr. Castro had

been favored with a batch of Soviet SA-2 high-altitude, antiaircraft missiles, which were subsequently credited with knocking down an American U-2 plane over Cuba. But only the CIA's Mr. McCone, insiders say, rightly read this intelligence lead as a highly suspicious sign that the Russians might have some very special reason for wanting to keep American aerial photography planes away from Cuba. Largely on this evidence, he interrupted a European honeymoon to write a memorandum to his CIA aides predicting that the Russians might be preparing to introduce offensive missiles in Cuba.

Other experts, already convinced that Mr. Khrushchev had no such intentions, dismissed the SA-2 evidence on the ground that similar weapons had been given by Russia to Indonesia and to the United Arab Republic; in neither case had the move foreshadowed shipments of big, strategic missiles.

## HAZARDOUS GUESSWORK

Original estimates of Soviet troop strength in Cuba went awry in somewhat the same way. Actually, counting the incoming Russian soldiers is impossible. Even envoys of Allied countries in Havana profess inability to estimate with much precision on the basis of what they can observe; "How can you be sure you aren't counting the same troops twice?" says one. What the United States usually can do is detect when troop transports arrive and estimate how many men probably were aboard. Also, it's possible to identify personnel carriers, tanks, and other specific pieces of military equipment by photo or by word-of-mouth reports and, by applying these figures to known tables of organization for Russian units, estimate how much manpower is likely to be involved.

But this is hazardous guesswork at best, at least in the beginning, and in Cuba it led the United States seriously astray. Now, experts say, more of the Soviet forces are organized into formal units in permanent encampments and their numbers can therefore be more accurately estimated.

Even so, the United States can't be certain about this, or about much else. There is, as President Kennedy observed last week, "no finite proof" that offensive weapons aren't stashed away in caves—but only U.S. confidence that any concealed missiles couldn't be made operational without detection. And if deductions from the relatively hard evidence of aerial photos are dangerous, intelligence analysts must also deal with a torrent of information of other sorts whose reliability is even more uncertain.

Even the reports of trained agents run a wide gamut of reliability, and must be graded accordingly. Untrained observers flood the Government with rumors and reports that are far harder to weigh.

Finally, no computer can sift the Government's massive intelligence yield. It must be evaluated by mere men, with preconceived notions, biased interests, conscious or unconscious prejudices. Military intelligence authorities, for example, generally take the darkest view. With responsibility for possible action if Cuba should turn into an active military threat, they don't usually err on the conservative side. If the United States was somewhat slow in accepting as "hard" the evidence of the Cuban missile buildup, the explanation for that they may well trace to the overwhelming view of Soviet experts here that Mr. Khrushchev wouldn't ship missiles out of Russia because he never had before.

## DANGER OF DISTRACTION

Small wonder, then, that policy-makers move cautiously toward hard judgments on intelligence. Yet politicians as well as the public prefer to deal in neat, hard "facts." The result is a partisan debate, not over what the U.S. Government ought to do about the Communist military penetration of Cuba

it admits to knowing about, but over the question of whether the penetration isn't a good deal deeper than the U.S. Government admits. Maybe it is; perhaps, also, U.S. intelligence gathering needs jacking up. But the public controversy over the accuracy of specific intelligence data also risks distraction from the bigger Cuban problem.

And already it has provoked the administration, the experts fear, into dangerously detailed rebuttal, imperiling intelligence sources and resting the Government's prestige and credibility far too heavily on intelligence data which by its nature is seldom conclusive, sometimes erroneous, almost always imperfect—as well as astonishingly accurate, detailed, and prescient at times.

**Mr. GRUENING.** Mr. President, before the morning hour is concluded, I ask unanimous consent that I may address the Senate for 15 minutes on three subjects.

**Mr. HUMPHREY.** Mr. President, I would like to exercise my right under the morning hour.

**M. COOPER.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a moment so that I may make a comment on the speech which the Senator from Montana has made?

**Mr. HUMPHREY.** I yield.

**Mr. COOPER.** Mr. President, I would first like to say I am glad to have heard the statement made by the distinguished majority leader. He is not only a great Senator, but I can say in the finest sense, a great American. All of us, of both parties, respect him. We have confidence in what he says and does.

During the debate about Cuba, which has been going on for a long time, I have not spoken often. I have had no special sources of information. But chiefly, I have recognized, as have all of us, that the Cuban issue is a dangerous and delicate situation—one which I have never believed should become a partisan issue, because it affects the security of our country.

There has never been any question in my mind but that the President of the United States, in dealing with this difficult problem, has addressed himself to it with the greatest diligence and with the greatest concern for the security and best interests of our country.

Nevertheless, I speak today on the basis of my own study, because of my continued concern about the Soviet base in Cuba. It is the second statement I have made on this subject, and I want to speak with restraint.

Last year, when there were many calls for invasion and blockade before the discovery of the Soviet long-range missiles, I pointed out in a speech in the Senate that the imposition of a blockade could lead to a confrontation with Soviet Russia, which could lead to war; that it could lead to nuclear war; and that those who urged invasion, or a blockade, and all of us, must be prepared to the fullest extent to carry out all the implications of such a choice.

We are thankful that last year when the President made his decision—and it was the correct decision—that it did not result in war, but brought about the withdrawal, as I believe, of the Soviet long-range missiles. I salute him for his courageous and correct decision.

Nevertheless, I think we must now take into account the fact that the continuing

presence of Soviet forces and arms in Cuba is a matter of concern to this country, a concern which cannot be easily allayed, and their presence could well lead to a new crisis.

I think it correct—as the President and Secretary McNamara have said publicly, and as I understand Mr. McCone said in committee—that the administration, because of its various and many sources of intelligence, has the greatest capability to secure and evaluate information concerning Soviet military forces and weapons. Nevertheless, because it has been demonstrated that these appraisals have not always been accurate in the past, and because onsite inspection has been refused by Cuba, it is not possible to verify fully the judgment that additional weapons, and even weapons of offensive capacity, are not lodged in Cuba.

For myself, I wish to say that I accept the judgment of the administration at this time, because of its capacity to secure and evaluate the many sources of intelligence regarding Soviet strength and weapons. Nevertheless, if future developments should indicate a continued increase in Soviet forces or weapons of any character, it is inevitable that concern in this country will continue to mount.

If this occurs, I doubt very much that the administration could allay this concern by repetitions of the briefings by Secretary McNamara and other administrative officials, valuable as they were. In this respect I might say that I have had access to the briefing given the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and it gave me the impression that Soviet strength in Cuba had increased since last fall—though not in long-range capabilities.

I agree that this is a dangerous and delicate situation which demands that the greatest responsibility be exercised by the Members of Congress of both parties—for the President has the ultimate responsibility. In whatever course he takes, he must have the support of Congress and the people.

However, I point out that as a human factor, if developments should indicate that Soviet forces or weapons of any kind continue to be introduced into Cuba, it will be very difficult to expect Members of Congress to refrain from making such information available to the public. It might be better if they would make their information known to the administration, and to the intelligence agencies concerned. However, I repeat that if Members of Congress believe their sources are valid, it will be difficult for them not to make such information available to the public or to expect that they will not make it available.

I will not comment on the statements of every Member who has talked on this subject. However, I must say that I have listened to what the senior Senator from New York [Mr. KEATING] has said. I have never heard him, since he began this debate last fall, say anything other than with a constructive purpose. I have never heard him urge upon the administration any rash action.

I am glad that the President is now

urging Mr. Khrushchev to fulfill his promise to remove Russian troops from Cuba. Removal of the Soviet troops, in my view, is the crucial issue to which our policies should be directed. It is hard to believe that if Soviet troops are withdrawn, they would leave in the hands of Castro weapons and missiles capable of attacking the United States, or any other country in this hemisphere. Withdrawal of Soviet troops would be the best evidence, the best proof, that there are no missiles in Cuba capable of seriously threatening our country, or any other country in this hemisphere.

Conversely, if Soviet troops remain—remembering the false assurances of Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Gromyko last fall—the haunting uncertainty about the presence of missiles at this time, or their future introduction, will persist. We support the President's policy of obtaining removal of the Soviet troops. I believe it to be the crucial issue.

There has been much talk about the Monroe Doctrine. In my judgment it has already been compromised. However, I think the United States has the opportunity at this time to adopt a policy which will be effective—that is, the firm policy that it will not accept or tolerate a Russian base in Cuba or anywhere else in this hemisphere.

The President has valid grounds to insist upon the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Cuba, as well as missiles, on the basis of Russian promises made at the time of the crisis last year. I have no doubt that the President will pursue this policy by every diplomatic means. We hope he will be successful. I believe it is possible that he will be successful.

But, in the event that diplomatic measures do not suffice, the question will still be before us, with all its uncertainties.

If Russia does not accede to the President's reasonable and proper request for the withdrawal of troops, after such time as he believes reasonable, the President, supported by the Congress, should take the same firm measures that he took last fall, and impose a blockade.

Of course, the imposition of a blockade would bring again the risk of war. I do not believe the Soviet Union would risk a confrontation and nuclear war on this issue. Rather, I believe such action would establish the proposition that we will not accept or tolerate a Russian base in Cuba. If successful, it would be a policy which we can maintain for the entire hemisphere.

**Mr. JAVITS.** Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

**Mr. COOPER.** I yield.

**Mr. JAVITS.** I thank the Senator for yielding to me. I should like to say to him that I believe he is doing two things, and I should like to associate myself, if he will permit me to do so, with his statement.

First, he is putting into perspective these debates and discussions about the adequacy of the information, and the extent to which the American people were taken into confidence by the administration on what information the administration has or should have, and



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transferring it to the issue: What ought we to do about it?

Everyone agrees it is a serious matter, whether he is on this side of the aisle or whether it is the President and his Cabinet.

Secondly, the Senator from Kentucky is making clear to the President that he feels the country would back him even on the reintroduction of a quarantine—I believe that is the word the President used—and that the Senator is now equating the presence of Soviet organized units—and I use that word “organized” advisedly, because I have had some experience with the Armed Forces, because it is one thing to speak of 18,000 personnel, if that is the number, who are specialists or technicians, dispersed in many places, and an entirely different thing to speak of tightly organized military units, which, the Senator has pointed out, in the eyes of the American people, would possess the capability of some offensive military action.

Therefore the Senator feels that the procedure which the President used before is susceptible, within the compass of what the American people would expect, as the measure fitting the cause of reapplication of the proposal.

If I understand correctly what the Senator has said, I would like to associate myself with the Senator, because I feel exactly the same way. That is what I said over TV, but I am sure I did not say it as well.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I thank the Senator. The Congress in its resolution has affirmed its support to the President.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The time of the Senator has expired.

Mr. COOPER. I ask that I may be permitted to proceed for an additional 2 minutes.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, the Senator is recognized for an additional 2 minutes.

Mr. COOPER. Congress supported the President's declaration that he would take such steps as he felt necessary to protect the security of this country. He is pursuing diplomatic means to secure the withdrawal of Soviet troops. I believe the policy which would protect this country, and which would be a clear policy, is that we do not accept or tolerate the existence of a Russian base in Cuba, or anywhere else in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BREWSTER in the chair). Does the Senator from Kentucky yield to the Senator from Montana?

Mr. COOPER. I yield.

Mr. MANSFIELD. The distinguished Senator from Kentucky, as always, is most constructive in his approach to the difficulties which confront our Nation, not only with respect to domestic policy, but also, and most especially, in the field of foreign policy.

If the Senator from Kentucky was on the floor at the beginning of my remarks, he may have heard me say that I did

not call for a moratorium or a period of silence on Cuba. All that I was, in effect, asking for was constructive criticism, and that any information which was available would get to the sources in our Government which are charged with the task of evaluating that information.

As the Senator has pointed out, I too feel that the President has a grave responsibility. My mind goes back to last October 22, when the minority leader and I were in the White House, and when what the President proposed to do at that time was laid before us.

It was a grim moment in the history of this country. We could have been engaged in a nuclear war. I daresay that every member of the leadership who was there at that time, both Republicans and Democrats, felt that that was far more than a bare possibility. When I returned home, the people knew it. Most important of all, Mr. Khrushchev knew it. At that critical moment, the President made a decision on the basis of facts which had been evaluated, over and over again, by his intelligence advisers. That is the President's responsibility always, not ours, except incidentally.

I hope that if Members of Congress get any information from any source, they will see to it that it is brought to the attention of the proper authorities, because Mr. McCone told the Committee on Foreign Relations that every rumor, every bit of evidence, which is brought to the attention of his Agency is sifted through thoroughly.

So I ask for constructive criticism, not silence. I am asking for responsibility, not for shouting merely for the purpose of making a noise or for the purpose of achieving a little publicity. The country comes first—always. So far as we are concerned—Republicans and Democrats—we come second—always.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, first, I wish to compliment the distinguished Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], the majority leader, and the distinguished Senator from Kentucky [Mr. COOPER] upon their statements today relating to the Cuban situation. This is the kind of discussion and debate which lends dignity to the Senate.

The Senator from Kentucky is considered to be one of the most able and informed Members of this body in the field of foreign policy. The majority leader of the Senate is looked upon as a scholar in this area. When these two able public servants speak as they did today, it ought to be reassuring to the American people.

During the past weekend, I was in my home State. I must confess that in talking with my fellow citizens, I found them worried, concerned, and confused over the Cuban situation, because of the many conflicting reports which come to their attention through the news media. Of course, these reports are the result of statements by Members of Congress and the executive branch. It was my hope that the statement of the Secretary of Defense on the radio and television and before the representatives of the press during the past week would do much to

clarify the situation relating to our policy on Cuba. It is regrettable that following his full and complete statement, with extensive documentation, there is still dispute and argument over the so-called facts of Russian troops and Soviet arms in Cuba.

Mr. President, it is the duty of the President of the United States and Members of Congress to give direct, frank, and candid answers to the American people. I, for one, believe that the President is doing just that. I believe that the Secretary of Defense has done so and will continue to do so. I believe that both the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence are being candid and frank.

As the majority leader has said to the Senate today, we can help in the system of information and intelligence by making available to the executive officers of the Government whatever information we as Senators or Representatives may have. Then, if these officials fail to follow up on such alleged facts, they should be taken to the public in a responsible fashion.

A clear statement of our purpose and policy toward Cuba is needed, even though I feel that that purpose and policy are generally well understood. First, we in the United States and in this Government have as a policy the freedom of Cuba from the present dictatorship of Fidel Castro and from occupation by Soviet troops. We should make it clear to the world that Cuba is as much occupied today as is Hungary, and that Soviet troops are there to impose their domination upon Cuba. We have as our purpose, the withdrawal of such troops and armaments from Cuba. How that is to be done can best be determined by the executive branch of the Government.

As the director of the CIA has testified, all information relating to the security of the United States is given the most meticulous scrutiny. All leads will be checked out. Nothing will be swept under the rug. This is a very sensitive situation. The United States has commitments all over the world. There are trouble spots in many areas of the world that cannot be ignored or forgotten. The possibility of nuclear war is ever present. Therefore, our approach to these problems must be carefully designed, taking all these factors into consideration, and must be handled in a most meticulous and prudent manner.

Second. We must have the objective of restoring free government in Cuba through progressive programs of political and economic reform. In all this, we need the counsel, advice, and cooperation of our Latin-American friends and neighbors. President Kennedy journeys to San Jose, Costa Rica, for his meeting in late March with the presidents of the Central American Republics. I am hopeful that high on the agenda of this important meeting will be a statement of common policy on the part of the United States with our Central American neighbors and other Latin American neighbors along the lines I have indicated today.

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The American people will not be content until our objectives and purposes are realized by a program of action. There are many details that can be discussed at a later date.

It is imperative that rash charges which cannot be substantiated by facts do not find their way into this Chamber or into the media of public information. It is the solemn duty of every public official in this country to speak with caution and to use prudent judgment and extreme care when he discusses these highly sensitive and dangerous situations.

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will the Senator from Minnesota yield for a question?

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HART in the chair). Does the Senator from Minnesota yield to the Senator from Alaska?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I yield.

Mr. GRUENING. Does not the able Senator from Minnesota believe that the holding of the conference in Costa Rica is particularly appropriate, because of the conspicuously democratic government of that country?

Mr. HUMPHREY. I certainly do. There is no area in which there is greater concern over the Communist regime of Fidel Castro and its effect upon democratic institutions and Republics throughout Latin America. The conference at San Jose can be a highly significant one. It is in the right environment, with the right people, and under the right auspices; and I hope that out of that conference will come not only another condemnation of Castroism, but also a program of democratic action. Many things can be done and should be done. The economic noose can be tightened around Cuba. The freedom fighters within Cuba can be aided. Guerrilla fighters can be trained. Subversion can be combated. Many other things can be done.

This Government, in cooperation with other Latin American governments, has instituted and has had underway for some time a program to meet Communist subversion in Latin America—by training counteragents, by strengthening the police forces, by the preparation of counterpropaganda programs, and by a host of other things. It is necessary that there be considerable expansion of the many efforts which are being made by our Government and by other governments to check the movement of Communist subversion and ultimately to destroy the Communist penetration of this hemisphere. The American people will be satisfied with nothing less.

#### TRIBUTE TO ROBERT FROST

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, only recently the Nation suffered a tragic loss in the death of one of its great citizens and great poets, Robert Frost. Today, we should pause to honor the memory of this beloved American poet.

The mantle of greatness has never been limited to the athlete, the orator, the soldier, the adventurer, the leader. It has its more quiet and unobtrusive forms, its peaceful sunsets, and its child's

innocence. It has forms that capture us unaware in gentle assaults, placing something beautiful in our hearts forever. Such was the greatness of Robert Frost.

Now the sure voice that sang from the strong hills of Vermont has been stilled, but only for a moment, only out of respect for the eternalness of death, for a true poet's voice never dwindles away into echoes, but rings clearly for all ages.

His fellow poets around the world loved him as one of the master singers, the poet of strength and simplicity. And to millions of Americans he was America's greatest poet, a craggy-faced New Englander, who sang of his rugged country in a way they had never heard before.

He published his first book of poems, "A Boy's Will," while living with his wife on a farm in England. He was 40 years old then, and soon returned to America, to publish volume after volume of poetry. Thousands remember being enthralled by his wry Yankee humor at his innumerable platform readings around the country. Honor after honor began to come his way as his fame spread. He won the Pulitzer Prize four times. And in January of 1961 he traveled from his farm in Vermont to read one of his poems at President Kennedy's inauguration, an event which gave public acknowledgment to his place as the first poet of the land.

Let us mark with restraint the passing of this man. Let us build him no monuments. Can we add to those he has built himself? Every schoolchild has read them and felt them and had his life enriched by them. Let us only record here one of his most beloved poems, "Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening," a poem which stands peculiarly by itself as a fitting eulogy of Robert Frost.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of this poem be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the poem was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

Whose woods these are I think I know.

His house is in the village though;

He will not see me stopping here

To watch his woods fill up with snow.

My little horse must think it queer

To stop without a farmhouse near

Between the woods and frozen lake

The darkest evening of the year.

He gives his harness bells a shake

To ask if there is some mistake.

The only other sound's the sweep

Of easy wind and downy flake.

The woods are lovely, dark and deep.

But I have promises to keep.

And miles to go before I sleep.

And miles to go before I sleep.

#### HOW FARES THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS?

Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, recently our able colleague, the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse], the chairman of the Subcommittee on American Republics Affairs, of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, delivered before the Women's National Democratic Club an admirable summary

of the situation existing in the southern portion of the Western Hemisphere. His address was entitled "Basic Facts for an Understanding of Latin America."

I ask unanimous consent that his speech be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

#### BASIC FACTS FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF LATIN AMERICA

(Remarks of Senator WAYNE MORSE before the Women's National Democratic Club, Washington, D.C., January 23, 1963)

The first fact which is essential to an understanding of Latin America is that Latin America does not exist except as a shorthand expression to describe a large geographic area lying generally to the south and east of the Rio Grande River and the Florida Straits. Included in this are 19 independent republics, 1 Soviet satellite, 2 sovereign members of the British Commonwealth, and a congeries of British, French, Dutch, and American territories in varying degrees of self-government.

I shall limit my remarks tonight to the 19 independent republics and to the 1 Soviet satellite, because these are the countries, stretching from Mexico to Argentina on the continental land mass and including the island countries of Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic in the Caribbean, which most people in the United States mean when they speak of "Latin America." But this all-inclusive term obscures the individual characteristics which make each of the 20 countries unique. These unique qualities are further obscured by the fact that all 20 have a common religion, and 18 have a common language.

The truth is that nowhere else in the world, except on adjacent sides of the Iron Curtain, does one find such startling differences. Consider, for example, Argentina and Bolivia, which have a common boundary. Argentina is more than 90-percent white, almost 90-percent literate, with a good industries base, and—until its recent deterioration—a good infrastructure. Bolivia is more than 90-percent Indian, less than one-third literate, with no significant industry and with the barest beginnings of infrastructure. Furthermore, almost two-thirds of the Bolivian people do not speak Spanish, but only their ancient Indian language. The per capita gross national product in Argentina is something more than \$400; in Bolivia, it is substantially less than \$100.

Now, I have admittedly taken one of the most extreme cases. Yet, except for the fact that Argentina and Bolivia have a common boundary, this is no more extreme than the differences between, say, Venezuela and Haiti; or between Uruguay and Paraguay. And important differences can be found between any other pair of Latin American countries.

It is a cardinal error ever to generalize about Latin America except in the most banal terms. I make this point as strongly as possible to put you on your guard against my generalizations which will follow. These are, to a large extent unavoidable, because although I modestly claim some renown for the length of some of my speeches, even I cannot do justice to 20 countries individually in a single speech. I will try to do justice to them collectively, and I will try to indicate the generalizations which are subject to the most exceptions. But I warn you again that little of what I say will be applicable to all 20 countries, and none of it will be applicable with equal force.

One of the keys to this diversity is found in Latin America's geography. Most of the huge land area of Latin America provides an inhospitable physical environment. It